Field goal percentage is a kick-distance stat
Field goal percentage looks like the cleanest number in football. A kick goes through the uprights or it does not, there is no judgment call about who deserves credit, and the kicker is the only player whose name goes in the box. That simplicity is exactly the problem. A kicker’s season percentage is mostly a summary of which kicks he was asked to try, and those decisions are made by the offense that stalled, the coach who chose not to go for it, and the stadium the schedule sent him to. The kicker controls the swing of his leg. He does not control the menu.
Distance does most of the work
Make probability falls steeply with distance. Kicks from inside the 30-yard range are close to automatic for any professional, the high 30s and 40s are routine but not guaranteed, and attempts beyond 50 yards are made at a meaningfully lower rate even by the best kickers in the league. The curve is not linear either: the drop-off accelerates past the mid-40s, where the margin for a slight mishit shrinks and the ball has to stay on line longer while losing speed. Every kicker in the league lives on roughly the same curve, with the best ones sitting a little above it.
Now put two kickers side by side. One works for an offense that reaches the red zone often and stalls inside the 15, so most of his attempts are chip shots. The other plays for a team that moves the ball to midfield and then asks him to bail the drive out from 52. The first kicker can post a gaudy percentage while being merely average at every distance; the second can be genuinely better at every distance and still finish lower. The season figure blends a skill measurement with a schedule of difficulty, and the schedule usually dominates.
The coach chooses the attempts
Fourth-down behavior shapes the distance profile more than most fans realize. A conservative coach kicks on fourth-and-short from the opponent’s 10, adding easy makes to the ledger. An aggressive coach goes for it in exactly those spots and instead sends the kicker out for long tries at the end of halves or when the offense bogs down near midfield. The analytics-driven shift toward going for it on fourth down over the last several seasons has therefore done something subtle to kicking statistics: it has removed many of the shortest, safest attempts from some kickers’ workloads while leaving the hard ones in place.
Coaches also make the opposite bet. As kickers have grown stronger and more accurate from distance, teams have become more willing to attempt kicks that would have been punts a generation ago. Attempts from 50 and beyond have become a regular part of the game rather than an end-of-half novelty. Each of those is a lower-probability kick, and a kicker whose coach trusts his leg will see more of them. Trust, in other words, shows up in the stat line as a lower percentage.
Weather, altitude, and the home stadium
Distance is the biggest input, but the conditions are a close second. A kicker who plays half his games in a dome kicks in still air at a constant temperature eight times a year. A kicker based in a cold, open-air stadium near a lake or the ocean deals with swirling wind, wet footing, and a hard, less lively ball through the late season, precisely when playoff seeding is at stake. Denver’s altitude helps the ball carry, which is one reason so many of the longest kicks in league history have happened there. None of these effects is about the kicker’s ability, and all of them are baked into his percentage.
The home stadium matters more than the road schedule because it is half the sample and it repeats every year. A dome kicker and an outdoor kicker in a hostile climate are not taking the same test, and comparing their percentages directly is like comparing two quarterbacks without noticing that one throws into a crosswind every other week. Bad conditions also change which attempts happen at all, because coaches know a December kick into the wind is not the same kick indoors.
Small samples make the noise louder
A full-time kicker attempts somewhere in the range of a few dozen field goals in a season. That is a tiny sample for a binary outcome. Two or three misses separate a percentage that reads as elite from one that reads as replaceable, and those misses can come from a bad snap, a low hold, a blocked kick, or a gust at the wrong moment. Slice the season by distance and the samples shrink further: a kicker may only try a handful of kicks beyond 50 yards in a year, which tells you very little about his true rate from that range.
This is why kicker performance looks so volatile from one season to the next, and why teams cut kickers after short slumps that may be nothing more than variance. It is also why career-length samples are far more informative than any single year. A kicker who has been above the league curve at every distance over several hundred attempts is probably good; a kicker who was perfect for one season on a soft schedule of attempts has not proven much yet.
Better ways to measure a kicker
The first fix is simple: report make rates by distance band. Split attempts into groups such as under 30, 30 to 39, 40 to 49, and 50 and beyond, and compare each kicker to the league rate in each band. That alone strips out most of the difficulty problem and reveals kickers whose raw percentage is hiding either real skill or real weakness.
The stronger fix is an expected-make model. Assign every attempt a probability based on its distance and, where the data allow, its conditions: temperature, wind, precipitation, altitude, surface, and whether the kick was indoors. Sum those probabilities to get the number of makes an average kicker would have produced on the same set of attempts, then compare the kicker’s actual makes. The difference, makes above expectation, is a far better estimate of skill than raw percentage. Like any model output, it depends on the controls chosen, and different versions will disagree at the margins, but nearly all of them agree more with each other than with raw percentage.
Extra points belong in the same conversation. Since the league moved the line of scrimmage for the conversion back in 2015, turning it into roughly a 33-yard kick, the extra point is no longer a formality. Missed conversions became noticeably more common after the change, and a kicker’s reliability on them is now real information. Folding extra points into an expected-points framework, rather than leaving them in a separate column nobody reads, gives a fuller picture of what a kicker contributes.
How to read it
When you look up a kicker, treat the season percentage as the start of a question rather than an answer. Check how many attempts it rests on, how many came from long range, and where his home games are played. Look at the team context too: an offense that stalls in the red zone feeds its kicker easy makes, and a coach who goes for it aggressively on fourth down takes them away. A low percentage on a long, outdoor, high-difficulty workload can describe a better kicker than a high percentage built on chip shots in a dome.
The honest read
Field goal percentage is not useless, but it measures the attempts as much as the kicker. The distance profile is decided by the offense and the coach, the conditions are decided by the schedule and the stadium, and the sample is too small for a single season to settle much. Distance-band rates and expected-make models do the adjustment that raw percentage skips. As fourth-down aggression and long-range confidence keep reshaping who attempts what, the gap between the raw number and the real skill is likely to widen, not close.